Rethinking the “Religious-Question” Doctrine by Lund, Christopher C.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 5 Religious Law in the 21st Century Article 8
5-15-2014
Rethinking the “Religious-Question” Doctrine
Christopher C. Lund
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, First Amendment Commons, and
the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher C. Lund Rethinking the “Religious-Question” Doctrine, 41 Pepp. L. Rev. 1013 (2013)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol41/iss5/8
 1013 
Rethinking the  
“Religious-Question” Doctrine 
Christopher C. Lund* 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE RELIGIOUS-QUESTION DOCTRINE ......... 1014
II. THE HEART OF THE RELIGIOUS-QUESTION DOCTRINE ..................... 1019
III. A WORD ABOUT THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ......................................................................... 1024
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 1027
 
The “religious-question” doctrine is a well-known and commonly 
accepted notion about the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses.  The general 
idea is that, in our system of separated church and state, courts do not decide 
religious questions.  And from this premise, many things flow—including 
the idea that courts should dismiss otherwise justiciable controversies when 
they would require courts to decide religious questions.1 
Yet a vexing thought arises.  The religious-question doctrine comes out 
of a notion that secular courts cannot resolve metaphysical or theological 
issues.  But when one looks at the cases that courts dismiss because of the 
religious-question doctrine, none of them involve questions of a 
metaphysical or theological nature.  Cases sometimes require decisions 
about what particular individuals or religious communities happened to 
believe, how they acted, or what motivated their actions.  But those are 
temporal and empirical questions, which courts can investigate the same way 
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.  I am grateful for 
comments received on this paper at a conference last fall on Religious Institutionalism at DePaul 
University School of Law. 
 1.  See Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious 
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1844 (1998) (concluding that “secular courts must not 
determine questions of religious doctrine and practice”); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (concluding that judicial 
decisions cannot “turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and 
practice”). 
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they investigate everything else.  So when some claim that the doctrine is 
needed to keep the government out of theological issues or to maintain the 
government’s religious neutrality, they seem to go wrong.  And when this 
thread gets pulled, the religious-question doctrine just seems to unravel. 
While this short symposium piece leaves much unanswered, it suggests 
that a reconceptualization of the religious-question doctrine might be in 
order.  If the religious-question doctrine is not primarily about the 
government’s inability to decide theological or metaphysical questions, what 
is it about?  This piece tentatively suggests an answer: It is about religious 
liberty.  Courts stay out of religious questions when they believe religious 
liberty is best advanced by courts staying out of religious questions.  And 
courts get involved in religious questions when they believe religious liberty 
is best advanced by courts getting involved in religious questions.  At 
bottom, the religious-question doctrine has more to do with religious liberty 
than religious questions. 
I.  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE RELIGIOUS-QUESTION DOCTRINE 
The idea that the government, and courts in particular, should not take 
positions on religious issues has a long history.  Two centuries ago, James 
Madison denied that “the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious 
Truth.2  A century earlier, John Locke had said basically the same thing.3   
American courts turned this idea into a legal principle through a series 
of disputes over church property going back to the nineteenth century.  
 
 2.  See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 
(1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 301 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 
1973) (“[T]hat the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious Truth . . . is an arrogant 
pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world . . . 
.”). 
 3.  As Andrew Koppelman explains,  
Locke also thought that the state was generally incompetent to adjudicate religious 
questions:  
The one only narrow way which leads to Heaven is not better known to the 
Magistrate than to private Persons, and therefore I cannot safely take him for my 
Guide, who may probably be as ignorant of the way as my self, and who certainly is 
less concerned for my Salvation than I my self am. 
Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1831, 1859–60 (2009) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 37 (James 
H. Tully ed., 1983) (1689)). 
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Watson v. Jones involved a fight over slavery between two factions of a 
Presbyterian church.4  The national Presbyterian Church (the General 
Assembly) had ruled for the anti-slavery side, but the Kentucky courts 
declared its actions unlawful.  Reversing this decision, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the Kentucky courts should not have 
countermanded the General Assembly.  Judges cannot decide “the true 
standard of faith,”5 so courts must abstain from disputes that are “strictly and 
purely ecclesiastical in . . . character.”6 
The religious-question doctrine came into full bloom almost a century 
later in Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull.7  Mary Elizabeth also involved warring 
factions fighting over church property.  Watson had been about slavery; 
Mary Elizabeth was about women’s ordination.  The national church had 
decided to ordain women, and in response, a dissenting congregation sued to 
secede and take its property with it.8  To resolve this dispute, the Georgia 
courts applied the old English rule, which required courts faced with a 
church split to decide which of the factions came closest to the original 
beliefs of the church.9  This, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded, 
was unconstitutional.  “First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized 
when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil 
courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”10  As a result, 
“the [First] Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide . . . 
disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious 
doctrine.”11 
Mary Elizabeth forms the heart of the religious-question doctrine.12  But 
 
 4.  80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
 5.  Id. at 727. 
 6.  Id. at 733. 
 7.  Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 
393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
8. Id. at 442–43. 
 9.  Id. at 443–44 & n.2.  
 10.  Id. at 449. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  See Koppelman, supra note 3, at 1836 (citing Mary Elizabeth as exemplifying the “state’s 
incompetence to decide matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice or belief”); 
EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES AND 
POLICY ARGUMENTS 901 (4th ed. 2011) (citing Mary Elizabeth as part of the “No Religious 
Decisions Principle,” whereby “[g]overnment officials may not . . . interpret religious doctrine” 
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if one reflects on it, there was no theological or metaphysical question in 
Mary Elizabeth.  It can seem that way, when one contemplates a court 
having to decide which church faction is closer in theology to the original 
church.  But the old English rule applied by the lower courts in Mary 
Elizabeth was simply an outgrowth of a generally applicable idea about 
implied trusts: When an organization splits into two, the property should go 
where the original donor of the party would have wanted it to go.13  The 
dispositive legal issue in Mary Elizabeth was really an empirical one about 
the beliefs of the original donor of the property: What did he or she believe, 
and where would he or she have wanted the property to go?   
Neither Watson nor Mary Elizabeth involves any theological or 
metaphysical question, and the last case in this chain, Milivojevich,14 is 
precisely the same.  The Supreme Court there held that a deposed bishop 
could not bring claims arguing that his removal had been improper under 
church law.15  The bishop there did not claim a right to reinstatement based 
on a reading of God’s will; he claimed a right to reinstatement based on the 
written policies and procedures of the Serbian Orthodox Church.  But this 
too, the Court held, was constitutionally precluded. 
It may help to draw a distinction between two kinds of religious 
questions.  First-order questions are theological and metaphysical 
questions—whether a religious claim, such as the existence of God or the 
divinity of Christ, is true or false.  Second-order questions are temporal and 
empirical questions—sociological questions about the beliefs or structure of 
a religious group, psychological questions about the religious beliefs and 
motivations of individual believers, and so on.  While the distinction 
between first-order and second-order questions is not airtight, it does run 
deep.16  Among other things, it explains how the public schools can 
 
(emphasis omitted)); Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal 
State, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 47, 57 (citing Mary Elizabeth as one of the cases establishing the principle 
that “courts must avoid intervening in religious disputes when doing so would entail their deciding 
theological or ecclesiastical questions”). 
 13.  Mary Elizabeth, 393 U.S. at 443–44 & n.2. 
 14.  See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America & Canada v. 
Milivojevich. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
 15.  Id. at 724–25. 
 16.  The two categories inevitably overlap.  Religions sometimes make theological claims about 
history, for example.  Such claims—historical claims about the resurrection of Christ or about the 
plates revealed to Joseph Smith—are both first- and second-order questions.  As an example of an 
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successfully teach about religion (second-order propositions) without 
teaching religion (first-order propositions). 
First-order religious questions are what Madison and Locke had in 
mind—and it is true enough that courts must abstain from such questions, if 
they are to maintain their religious neutrality.  But second-order religious 
questions seem fully within the investigatory capability of secular courts.  
And Watson, Mary Elizabeth, and Milivojevich all involve second-order, not 
first-order, questions. 
The same is true for the universe of lower-court cases as well.  Courts 
universally dismiss claims of clergy malpractice.17  One can sue one’s 
lawyer or doctor for malpractice, but not one’s priest or rabbi.  Courts say 
that adjudicating these cases would require them to decide religious 
questions,18 and commentators agree.19  But the questions presented in these 
cases are second-order ones.  There need be no theological or metaphysical 
judgment in any of them.  Such cases only require what every negligence 
case requires: A decision about the norms in some particular community—in 
this case, a religious community.  Whether a priest or rabbi acted in 
conformance with the expectations of his or her congregation is a purely 
sociological inquiry.  If we did not care about religious liberty, we would 
 
overlapping claim, consider a Fifth Circuit opinion that took less than a page to conclude that a 
plaintiff could not bring a defamation suit claiming that the Scorsese film, The Last Temptation of 
Christ, made false historical claims about Jesus Christ.  See Nayak v. MCA, Inc., 911 F.2d 1082 (5th 
Cir. 1990). 
 17.  See, e.g., DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 829 A.2d 38, 46 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2003) (“‘[C]ourts throughout the United States have uniformly rejected claims for clergy 
malpractice under the First Amendment. . . .’” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
 18.  See, e.g., F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 703 (N.J. 1997) (noting that “such a claim 
requires definition of the relevant standard of care,” which “could embroil courts in establishing the 
training, skill, and standards applicable for members of the clergy in a diversity of religions with 
widely varying beliefs”). 
 19.  See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 
2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1823 (“Courts have good reason to reject claims of clergy malpractice 
when such claims invite the court to determine the standard of pastoral care for a ‘reasonable 
Catholic priest’ or a ‘reasonable Orthodox rabbi’ [because] [t]hese are judgments that only that 
particular religious tradition can render and are precisely the kinds of appraisals that the doctrine of 
ecclesiastical immunity bars.”); Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline 
of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 232–33 (2000) (noting that the tort would require 
“government assessment of the religious doctrine [that] is especially problematic where there is 
doctrinally-based intrachurch disagreement concerning the nature of the pastoral function,” because 
“the court might very well have to adjudge [which is] correct. . . .”). 
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resolve these clergy-malpractice cases on their merits. 
As an example, consider Houston v. Mile High Adventist Academy, 
where a Seventh-Day Adventist sued her Seventh-Day Adventist high 
school, claiming that she was “‘subjected to an inferior and substandard 
Biblical Christian education.’”20  The court dismissed the case on First 
Amendment grounds.21  But the claim there posed no true theological 
question.  The plaintiff did not argue that the theology taught by the school 
was wrong; the plaintiff argued that the school taught a theology rejected by 
most Seventh-Day Adventists.  Of course, resolving this kind of dispute 
would require evidence about Seventh-Day Adventist theology.  Both sides 
would probably seek to introduce documents from the church about its 
theology, reports from experts about the church’s beliefs, and testimony 
from lay people about their expectations.  A jury would need to resolve the 
conflict, but the jury’s resolution would not be a pronouncement about who 
is correct theologically.  It would be simply a pronouncement about whether 
the school has complied with the reasonable expectations of its religious 
community. 
When one looks at the lower-court cases this way, it turns out that none 
of them involve first-order religious questions.  Priests and rabbis have been 
universally unsuccessful at getting courts to adjudicate claims that they were 
fired without the good cause required by their written contracts.22  But such 
claims only require judgments about what the parties intended in their 
contractual language.  Defamation suits get dismissed, although they only 
require decisions about whether a false statement of fact was knowingly 
made.23  Excommunication and shunning cases get dismissed, even though 
they involve the same kinds of issues as ordinary intentional infliction of 
emotional distress cases.24  None of these cases involve metaphysical or 
 
 20.  846 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (D. Colo. 1994) (quoting the plaintiff’s complaint). 
 21.  Id. (“[M]y adjudication of whether Andrea was provided an adequate Biblical Christian 
education in accordance with the tenets of the Seventh Day Adventist church is barred by the first 
amendment.”). 
 22.  See, e.g., Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654, 655 (2d Cir. 2009); Leavy v. 
Congregation Beth Shalom, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1013 (N.D. Iowa 2007); Kraft v. Rector, 
Churchwardens & Vestry of Grace Church in N.Y., No. 01-7871, 2004 WL 540327, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 17, 2004). 
 23.  See, e.g., Purdum v. Purdum, 301 P.3d 718 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013); Ex parte Bole, 103 So. 3d 
40 (Ala. 2012). 
 24.  See, e.g., Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007); Paul v. Watchtower Bible & 
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theological questions.  But courts dismiss them anyway.  
Despite this, commentators still continue to describe the religious-
question doctrine as being necessary to keep courts away from issues of 
religious truth.  The “animating idea,” as one scholar described the religious-
question doctrine, “is that the government may not declare religious truth.”25  
In his famous treatise, Laurence Tribe once described the religious-question 
doctrine as “reflect[ing] the conviction that government—including judicial 
as well as the legislative and executive branches—must never take sides on 
religious matters.”26  But if these commentators are right, then the religious-
question doctrine seems massively overbroad.   
Some have sensed that there is a problem here—that the religious-
question doctrine has grown far beyond what its rationales would justify.  
Usually they conclude that the religious-question doctrine should be 
narrowed, often dramatically narrowed.  Sam Levine wrote such a piece 
fifteen years ago,27 Jared Goldstein wrote one ten years ago,28 and Michael 
Helfand wrote one quite recently.29  
II.  THE HEART OF THE RELIGIOUS-QUESTION DOCTRINE  
So what explains the overbreadth in the religious-question doctrine?  
Why do courts dismiss cases out of a desire to avoid deciding theological 
questions when the cases themselves do not involve theological questions?  
The answer seems simple enough.  Courts are convinced that letting these 
cases go forward would create real religious liberty problems.  In Mary 
Elizabeth, for example, one real problem the Supreme Court faced was that 
 
Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 25.  Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State’s Interest in the Development of 
Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645, 1658 (2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted) 
see also, e.g., Mary Jean Dolan, Cautious Contextualism: A Response to Nelson Tebbe’s 
Nonbelievers, 98 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 32, 36 (2012), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/ 
virginialawreview.org/files/Dolan%20Nonbelievers%20Response.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) 
(“[T]he rationale for this ‘hands off’ doctrine [is] judicial incompetence to decide religious 
questions, which involve the supernatural and non-rational.”). 
 26.  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 1231 (2d ed. 1988). 
 27.  Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of 
Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85 (1997). 
 28.  Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine? Judicial Authority to 
Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497 (2005). 
 29.  Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493 (2013). 
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the old English rule had grown into a system where churches could not 
change their religious doctrines without jeopardizing their property.30  Even 
a single dissenter that wanted things the old way could claim a departure 
from doctrine and sue for control of the property.31  In the suit attacking the 
theology taught by the Seventh-Day Adventist high school, the real problem 
is not that the court would have trouble figuring out Seventh-Day Adventist 
theology, but that a plaintiff could have a legal right to control a school’s 
religious teaching.32  And the same seems true for the clergy malpractice 
cases, the defamation cases, and all the rest.  They involve no true 
theological questions, but courts still see them as dangerous to their 
conceptions of religious liberty.   
A good proof of this lies in how courts respond differently to the same 
religious question in different contexts.  Take the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC,33 which held that the First Amendment forbids ministers from 
bringing employment-based claims against their churches.  Both sides there 
raised concerns about religious questions.  Those in favor of the ministerial 
exception said that adjudicating these cases would envelop courts in 
religious questions about pretext and motivation.34  Those opposed to the 
ministerial exception said that dismissing these cases would envelop courts 
in religious questions about who is and who is not a minister.35  Both took 
the religious-question doctrine in plausible directions, although the Supreme 
 
 30.  See Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
 31.  See Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L. 
REV. 1142, 1148 (1962) (“Read literally, the Lord Chancellor’s opinion [in the English departure-
from-doctrine case, Pearson] seems to brook no doctrinal evolution within a congregation except on 
pain of forfeiture of its property.”). 
 32.  See supra, note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Houston v. Mile High Adventist 
Acad., 846 F. Supp. 1449 (D. Colo. 1994)). 
 33.  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 34.  See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 332 (3d ed. 
2011) (“Determining whether a church’s reasons for firing a minister were legitimate, as opposed to 
discriminatory, would require a court to evaluate religious questions.”). 
 35.  See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring in the order denying rehearing en banc) (“The very invocation of the ministerial 
exception requires us to engage in entanglement with a vengeance.”).  Professor Caroline Corbin 
calls this the irony of Hosanna-Tabor.  See Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951 (2011). 
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Court sided with the former. 
But now consider the Supreme Court’s other unanimous case about 
ministers.  McDaniel v. Paty36 invalidated a Tennessee statute barring 
ministers from serving as delegates to Tennesee’s 1977 constitutional 
convention.  One problem with the statute, according to the Court, was that 
it required courts to answer religious questions—courts would have to draw 
some line between ministers and non-ministers, which would inevitably be 
imperfect and might end up discriminating against minority faiths.37   
Yet this, of course, was the very charge leveled against the ministerial 
exception that the Court completely rejected!  Hosanna-Tabor establishes a 
special rule just for ministers, requiring an imperfect distinction between 
ministers and non-ministers.  Yet the Court in Hosanna-Tabor felt confident 
that it was up to the task.  While Justice Alito’s concurrence echoed 
McDaniel’s warning about possible discrimination against minority faiths, 
that became a reason not to abandon the ministerial exception but to 
strengthen it.38 
In a nice piece a few years ago, Rick Garnett looked at the idea of 
divisiveness in Establishment Clause cases.39  The concept, it turned out, was 
totally malleable.  The Supreme Court would say a program was divisive 
when it wanted to strike it down; the Court would say a program was not 
divisive when it wanted to uphold it; when the Court found an obviously 
divisive program that it wanted to uphold, the opinion would leave out any 
discussion of divisiveness as a consideration.40  All the talk about political 
divisiveness, Garnett pointed out, was just a distraction—a red herring.  The 
real work was being done elsewhere.41  This is my claim as regards the 
 
 36.  435 U.S. 618 (1978). 
 37.  See id. at 632 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is arguable that the provision 
not only discriminates between religion and nonreligion, but may, as well, discriminate among 
religions . . . .”). 
 38.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct at 711 (Alito, J., concurring) (worrying that a ministerial 
exception that applies only to those called “ministers” would be unfair to “Catholics, Jews, Muslims, 
Hindus, [and] Buddhists,” who “rarely if ever” use the term “minister” to “refer to members of their 
clergy”). 
 39.  See Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 
(2006). 
 40.  See id. at 1681–1708. 
 41.  See id. at 1669–70 (concluding that the divisiveness argument has “rarely been outcome-
determinative or done much real juridical work”). 
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religious-question doctrine.  There is simply no there there.  When courts 
think that religious liberty is best served by avoiding religious questions, 
they avoid religious questions.  When courts think that religious liberty 
requires answering religious questions, they answer religious questions.  The 
whole idea of religious questions drops out.  What matters is religious 
liberty, not religious questions. 
To give another example, consider what should be a simple question 
about religion: Are Roman Catholics Jewish?  The answer, of course, is no.  
If a child were to put this question to his public school teacher—a state agent 
constitutionally bound to maintain strict religious neutrality—the public 
school teacher would respond quickly and correctly.  Such a teacher cannot, 
of course, say that either Roman Catholicism or Judaism is true or false.  But 
such a teacher could surely point out the obvious—that they are indeed 
different.  Otherwise the teaching of history itself (let alone comparative 
religion) would be per se unconstitutional.42 
In all kinds of postures, judges feel the same way.  They simply answer 
the religious question, without any remorse.  Imagine a trust set up by a 
Jewish donor for the college expenses of Jewish children in a certain 
neighborhood.  Say a child from the same neighborhood is excluded because 
he is Roman Catholic.  If he sues, the court will enforce the trust.  The court 
will have no compunction in declaring that the Roman Catholic child is not 
Jewish.43 
But change the context.  Imagine now a trust set up by a Jewish father 
for his Jewish son, but a condition of the trust requires that the son not marry 
anyone who is not Jewish.  Say the son marries a Roman Catholic woman.  
Now the law suddenly becomes uncertain, and judges suddenly become 
 
 42.  The difference between teaching religion and teaching about religion is covered thoughtfully 
and in great detail in KENT GREENAWALT,  DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? (2007). 
 43.  For precisely this kind of case, see Lockwood v. Killian, 375 A.2d 998, 1000-01 (Conn. 
1977) (upholding the religious requirement in a scholarship program for “‘needy, deserving boys . . . 
who are members of the Caucasian race and who have . . . specifically professed themselves to be of 
the Protestant Congregational Faith,’” while simultaneously striking out the racial and gender 
requirements).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. f (2003) (noting that “a 
criterion such as gender, religion, or national origin” can be used “when it is a reasonable element of 
a settlor’s charitable purpose and charitable motivation” and that, for example, nothing should stop 
“a Jewish man from leaving money to a university to establish a scholarship program, in the 
betterment of his religion as he sees it, to enable a rabbi or two each year to study in that university’s 
philosophy department”). 
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tentative.  It turns out that courts are split on whether to enforce this kind of 
trust.44  And those that refuse to enforce this trust will talk about the 
difficulties of deciding whether someone is really Jewish or not. 
Change the context again.  Imagine a couple enters into a prenuptial 
agreement where they agree to raise their children Jewish and take them 
only to Jewish services.  When the couple divorces, the father becomes 
Catholic and claims that the prenuptial agreement is unenforceable.  This 
hypothetical is an actual case, Zummo v. Zummo, and the court there refused 
to enforce the prenuptial agreement.45  And in reaching this conclusion, the 
court relied heavily on the difficulties inherent in trying to figure out what is 
and is not Jewish.46 
In each of the three examples, the religious question facing the court is 
the same: Should Catholics be considered Jewish?  But courts respond to it 
in different ways.  In the first example, courts simply answer the question.  
In the second and third examples, courts are much more hesitant.  If the 
religious-question doctrine is simply about courts being unable to answer 
religious questions, this does not make much sense. 
But things make more sense if the religious-question doctrine is 
reconceived as being about religious liberty rather than about religious 
questions simpliciter.  Religious liberty requires different things in different 
contexts.  It therefore might require different approaches to the very same 
religious question, depending on the context.  In the first example above—
the college trust example—judges share a strong belief that private parties 
should be able to set up trusts to promote their personal religions.  This is a 
part of religious liberty, and it could not exist unless courts were willing to 
enforce religious trusts.   
In the second example—the trust prohibiting interfaith marriage—things 
get more complicated.  Religious liberty cuts both ways.  The instinct that 
 
 44.  The authors of the relevant Restatement would apparently not enforce this trust.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 illus. 3 (2003) (arguing that a “marriage condition [that] 
terminates all of N's rights if, before termination of the trust, he ‘should marry a person who is not of 
R Religion,’ . . . is an invalid restraint on marriage,” and providing citations of relevant cases). 
 45.  574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
 46.  Id. at 1146 (“The father is prohibited from taking his children to ‘religious services contrary 
to the Jewish’ faith.  What constitutes a ‘religious service?’  Which are ‘contrary’ to the Jewish 
faith?  What for the matter is the ‘Jewish’ faith?  Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, 
Reconstructionist, Messianic, Humanistic, Secular and other Jewish sects might differ widely on this 
point.”). 
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people should be able to create religious trusts still has a great deal of force.  
But enforcing this kind of trust gives one person lasting influence over the 
religious choices of someone else.  Balancing the competing interests is 
difficult, which explains why courts hesitate about the second trust.  
Similarly, the third example—the prenuptial agreement—also involves 
religious liberty cutting both ways.  On one hand, one thinks of the mother.  
Before she had children, she had been given the promise that her kids would 
be raised in her faith.  But there is also the father.  Any conception of 
religious liberty includes the right to convert—the right to change one’s 
mind.  To the extent that the father’s 1978 promise to raise his kids Jewish 
prevents him in 1991 from fulfilling his religious commitment to raise his 
kids Roman Catholic, that too is problematic. 
None of these issues is easy.  How any of them should be resolved is not 
clear.  But what is clear is that they are different problems, posing different 
issues that involve different considerations.  One would miss the boat 
entirely if one viewed these cases through the traditional religious-question 
doctrine, which would treat them as fundamentally the same because they 
involve the same religious question.   
III.  A WORD ABOUT THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE 
The religious-question doctrine is a standalone doctrine, but concerns 
about religious questions also enter into subsidiary doctrines relating to the 
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.  Here too, it seems like 
the Court’s approach has been guided not by any abstract fear of religious 
questions, but by its practical judgment about what best suits its conception 
of religious liberty. 
Take the Free Exercise Clause and the issue of regulatory exemptions.  
In the period before Employment Division v. Smith,47 the government could 
not interfere with religious beliefs and practices without a compelling 
interest.48  Thanks to the federal RFRA, state RFRAs, and state 
constitutional provisions, the compelling-interest test has been restored in 
 
 47.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 48.  See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963). 
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many jurisdictions.49  But there has always been a threshold showing that an 
individual plaintiff must make before the compelling-interest test is 
triggered.  And that threshold has always been a function of three variables: 
sincerity, centrality, and burden.   
This is where the concern about religious questions comes in.  In a 
series of cases, the Supreme Court has taken firm control of judicial 
inquiries into these three variables.  There is a strong presumption in favor 
of sincerity.  Courts must presume that religious beliefs are sincerely held, 
unless there is extraordinary contrary evidence.50  And legal doctrine often 
prevents courts from even taking into account that contrary evidence—
courts are not supposed to ask whether a religious belief is internally 
consistent,51 or whether a larger religious group shares that belief.52  Some 
Justices experimented with centrality as a variable for a time,53 but the 
Supreme Court ended up rejecting it as a consideration.54  Yet the burden 
issue has become part of the fabric of the law.  Cases now sometimes 
involve wide-ranging investigations as to whether a particular plaintiff has 
been “substantially burdened” by the law from which they seek exemption.55  
The Court thus treats sincerity, centrality, and burden quite differently.  It 
refuses to consider centrality; it looks at sincerity quite deferentially; it 
examines burden without much deference.   
There is nothing inconsistent about this.  These divergent approaches 
 
 49.  See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAS, 55 S.D. 
L. REV. 466, 469–73 (2010) (providing an overview of these developments). 
 50.  See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (“One can, 
of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be 
entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here . . . .”). 
 51.  See id. (“Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits 
that he is ‘struggling’ with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and 
precision that a more sophisticated person might employ.”). 
 52.  See Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t. of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (“[W]e reject the notion 
that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of 
a particular religious organization.”). 
 53.  See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 54.  See Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within 
the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith . . . .”). 
 55.  This is one of the most contested issues in the contraceptive-mandate cases now before the 
Supreme Court.  See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3139 (U.S. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-354); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. 
v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 
U.S.L.W. 3139 (U.S. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-356). 
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reflect practical judgments that the Court has made over the course of 
decades about what serves religious liberty best.  And many of them seem 
quite sound.  The Court’s deferential approach to sincerity, for example, 
came out of a lived experience that people inevitably doubt the sincerity of 
religious beliefs they do not share.56   
And these judgments are neither sacrosanct nor impervious to 
reconsideration.  The debate over the contraceptive mandate could well 
make us rethink the value of centrality as a consideration.  Many have 
sympathy for the Catholic Church’s claim not to provide insurance covering 
contraception and abortion.  But there is less sympathy for Tyndale House,57 
and even less for Hobby Lobby.58  That is not a difference in sincerity or 
burden; it is a difference in centrality.  And the fact that centrality is no 
longer a valid consideration could end up limiting free exercise—courts will 
be less likely to exempt the Catholic Church if it means having to exempt 
Hobby Lobby as well.  All of this is to say that how courts should treat these 
kinds of religious questions depends on the exterior conceptions they have of 
religious liberty. 
The history of the Establishment Clause illustrates the same point.  
Modern Establishment Clause cases revolve around whether the government 
has endorsed religion and inevitably when the government endorses religion, 
it takes a position on theological questions.59  But Justices in these cases 
have taken the idea of religious questions in radically different ways.  In Lee 
v. Weisman, the Court struck down government-sponsored prayer at a 
middle school graduation.60  In a separate concurrence, Justice Souter 
dismissed the idea that prayers should still be permitted as long as they were 
nondenominational.61  Such an inquiry, he said, would require “the courts to 
engage in comparative theology [and] I can hardly imagine a subject less 
 
 56.  See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“I do not 
see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as to what is 
believable.”). 
 57.  See Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F.Supp.2d 106 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 58.  See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 59.  See McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005) (“The prohibition on 
establishment covers a variety of issues from prayer in widely varying government settings . . . to 
comment on religious questions.”). 
 60.  505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 61.  Id. at 616–17 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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amenable to the competence of the federal judiciary, or more deliberately to 
be avoided where possible.”62   
But back in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice Kennedy had taken 
the idea of religious questions almost the opposite way.63  In that case, a city 
had put up holiday displays consisting of a crèche, a menorah, and a 
Christmas tree.  Justice Kennedy argued that the judiciary should stay its 
hand and uphold the challenged displays, for striking them down would 
require the Court to say what religious symbols really mean.  That, Justice 
Kennedy reasoned, would be improper: “This Court is ill-equipped to sit as a 
national theology board, and I question both the wisdom and the 
constitutionality of its doing so.”64  This again reveals how manipulable 
concerns about religious questions can be.  Justices can use them as a reason 
to invalidate government-sponsored religion; Justices can use them as a 
reason to uphold government-sponsored religion.  As with Hosanna-Tabor, 
both sides can cite the religious-question doctrine for their own purposes.  
But something is wrong when a doctrine can be invoked by either side with 
equal effectiveness. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This paper suggests that the Court’s religious-question doctrine is 
essentially parasitic on its conception of religious liberty.  One can try to 
defend the results of the religious-question doctrine, of course.65  But these 
results seem better defended by explicit recourse to concepts and principles 
of religious liberty, rather than vague and imprecise talk about religious 
questions. 
And focusing on religious liberty directly might broaden the religious-
question doctrine in some ways.  But it might narrow it in others.  Take, for 
example, the case of the Shari’a will—a testator who says that his estate 
should be partitioned among his heirs according to Shari’a law.  If anything 
is solid about the religious-question doctrine, it is that such a will cannot be 
 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 678 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 64.  Id. at 578. 
 65.  See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of 
Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (defending some of these results). 
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legally enforced.  But perhaps courts should enforce that will.  For, after all, 
a court that enforces this will does not endorse Shari’a or even decide what 
Shari’a really is—such a court is only making a decision about what this 
particular testator probably intended when he referred to Shari’a law in his 
will.  Of course the court might get those intentions wrong.  But that is 
always a risk with wills.  And whatever the risk, the court’s interpretation of 
Shari’a law is far more likely to accord with the testator’s intent than 
whatever default the intestacy laws provide.  There are probably more 
examples, but this is enough to make the necessary point.  We might be 
better off if we abandoned talk of religious questions. 
 
 
 
